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In this article I explore two postconflict societies – Northern Ireland and Lebanon – in regards to their 
different approaches to dealing with victims and victimhood. While in Northern Ireland the state and 
other agencies have constructed a victims’ sector, Lebanon’s political elites have advanced political 
amnesia to silence victims’ rights. To help conceptualize these divergent policies, I utilize two 
contrasting representations of the biopolitical, namely those formulated by Michel Foucault and 
Giorgio Agamben. Foucault’s original statement presents biopolitics as governance directed towards 
the production of collective life and well-being. Rather than promoting life, Agamben’s subsequent 
vision of the biopolitical sees modern sovereignty as established through its power over life. Foucault’s 
biopolitics, I argue, provides a framework to understand how the victims’ sector and victims’ 
subjectivity was constructed as part of the Northern Irish peace process.  Agamben’s version of the 
biopolitical allows scope to examine how victims and their families in Lebanon are rendered as ‘bare 
life’ and positioned within the state of exception. Despite the lack of unpredictable agency accorded by 
both Foucault and Agamben to biopolitical processes, I explore the complex forms of contestation – 










How a post-conflict society deals with so-called legacy issues, particularly victims of 
violence, is often considered the litmus test of whether a peace process is deemed 
successful (Brewer and Hayes, 2013).  The recognition of victims’ rights is vital for 
creating a political and social system that is inclusive, just and viable, and the postwar 
state in conjunction with international partners is supposed to develop a publically 
funded victims’ sector for individuals to receive support (Mendeloff, 2004). Yet the 
recognition of victims’ rights is hardly standard practice in postwar states. Many 
states deny victims’ rights as part of a concerted project of political amnesia. This 
quintessential peace versus justice trade-off in divided societies (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 
2009) demands that the immediate exigencies of statebuilding take precedence over 
the individual requirements of victims (Moon, 2009). In short, to secure the 
compliance of former warlords with the new peaceful order, these figures are granted 
amnesty from prosecution (ICTJ, 2014). 
 In this paper, I explore two post-conflict societies that exhibit contrasting 
approaches to victims: Northern Ireland and Lebanon. In Northern Ireland, the state 
and its partners have intervened to create a victims’ sector as part of its strategic 
commitment to foster political order. In Lebanon, alternatively, the postwar political 
elites, responsible for mass-scale sectarian disappearances during the civil war, have 
conspired to enforce state-led amnesia about victims to safeguard their hold on 
political and economic institutions. To understand these dynamics I deploy divergent 
concepts of the biopolitical as formulated first by Michel Foucault (1976, 1977, 1978, 
1980, 1982) and subsequently by Giorgio Agamben (1995, 1998, 1999). Foucault’s 
biopolitics traces how the development of governance strategies designed with 
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placing human life under regimes of authority over knowledge, power, and the 
processes of subjectivation. Rather than promoting life, Agamben’s vision of 
biopolitics sees modern sovereignty as established through its power over life. State 
sovereignty, according to Agamben, operates through its ability to reduce life to ‘bare 
life’, a process in which individuals and groups, framed as national security threats, 
are excluded from rights and exposed to murderous violence. 
 Foucault’s understanding of the biopolitical is used to examine the 
development of the victims’ sector in the Northern Ireland peace process. The 
endpoint of biopolitics, according to Foucault, is to make modern subjects and 
subjectivities. This objective includes two interrelated dimensions: the strategies used 
by governance for intervention on collective existence; and the modes of 
subjectification in which individuals and groups can be brought to work on 
themselves in the name of life and health. Thus, in Northern Ireland, the strategies of 
governance have led to the construction of a victims’ sector as part of its attempt to 
build security and political order. This project entailed an attempt to generate a new 
collective agency, in which the state gets certain groups to attach themselves to the 
victim identity so that the broader population will become more amenable to 
hegemonic control. Agamben’s divergent reading of the biopolitical is deployed to 
examine how victims and their families in Lebanon are rendered as ‘bare life’ and 
positioned within the state of exception. Through the use of political amnesia, the 
Lebanese state silences and violently excludes the rights of victims who are 
positioned as threats to state security.  
 Foucault and Agamben’s biopolitics have been critiqued for presenting 
themselves as totalising frameworks of power that permit minimal contestation (see 
Jamal and Sandor, 2010). In response, I draw attention to the complex and 
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unpredictable modes of agency generated by biopolitical processes, especially via the 
mobilization of victims’ movements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. In Northern 
Ireland, state funded victims’ movements emerged to challenge a peace process they 
view as profoundly unequal and which victimizes their ethnopolitical group, to the 
extent of destabilizing the peace process. In Lebanon, where amnesia is deeply 
embedded into the logic of the state, non-sectarian victims’ movements act as 
reminders of not only the war but the dangerous consequences of a political elite 
lacking accountability. Lebanese victims’ movement force the wider society to 
confront the legacy of the civil war, which continues to breed a culture of distrust 
between groups. 
 This paper is comparative on a number of levels. It compares two 
quintessentially ‘divided societies’ – Lebanon and Northern Ireland – in regards to 
their treatment of victims. As divided societies, Lebanon and Northern Ireland are 
marked by deep societal cleavages that have provided the basis for conflict. While 
ethnonational divisions – between Irish nationalists and UK unionists – mark 
Northern Ireland’s conflict, Lebanon is seen as largely ethnoreligious, but which has 
also overlapped with contending political aspirations. Contrasting forms of power-
sharing are used in both places to include the respective groups in government as part 
of the peace process, which has generated specific consequences for victims.  
The comparative aspect of this paper is further evident in terms of analysing victims’ 
movements in the two societies and through the application of two contrasting 
theories of biopolitics. As such, the methodology used in this paper rests on theory 
building approaches – how particular theories help explain and contextualize 
particular case studies. While scholars (Owens, 2009; Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017) 
have used biopolitics to understand a range of phenomena – particularly camp 
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refugees – the extension of biopolitics to victims of intrastate violence in this paper is 
unique. Thus, my intention is to encourage ‘conceptual travelling’ (Sartori, 1970) – 
the application of social theory to new cases. The data used in this paper comes from 
two major projects. For Northern Ireland, the author collected a range of materials, 
including pamphlets by victims’ groups, interviews with activists, and public policy 
documents. Much of this material is now housed in a permanent on-line digital 
archive. For Lebanon, ethnographic fieldwork was conducted during five fieldwork 
phases (September 2012, July 2014, June 2015, January 2016, September 2018), each 
of which lasted from one week to a month. Interviews (n = 29) in Beirut included 
leading activists in victims’ groups, including SOLIDE, ACT, UMAN, Families of 
the Disappeared. These organizations represent different constituencies of victims. 
Families of the Disappeared is a non-sectarian group mostly concerned with the status 
of victims kidnapped and murdered by the various militias during the civil war. 
SOLIDE, alternatively, exclusively focuses on Lebanese citizens detained by the 
Syrian security forces during its occupation of Lebanon (1975-2005). Families of the 
Disappeared and SOLIDE often cooperate for the purposes of protest and campaigns, 
which are coordinated by ACT. As families and representatives of victims in Lebanon 
continue to experience some state harassment, interviews are anonymized. Notably, 
many of the members of these organizations are elderly women, though in some cases 
the leading representatives are male.  
 
Biopolitics: Life, Wellbeing and Victims 
Biopower is a term most closely associated with the sociology of Michel Foucault. 
According to Foucault (1980: 36), the technologies of government underwent a ‘very 
profound transformation’ of the mechanisms of power’, so that the goal of governance 
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is primarily concerned with the welfare of the population, the improvement of its 
condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity and health. With biopolitics, 
governance focuses on the population at ‘the level of its aggregate effects’ (Foucault, 
2000: 219); it regulates the phenomena that typify groups of human beings, including 
‘propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, 
with all the conditions that can cause these to vary’ (Foucault, 1980: 139).  
Biopolitics, writes Foucault, is ‘power bent on generating forces, making them grow, 
and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, 
or destroying them’ (1978: 136). Biopower, therefore, exposes the structure, relations, 
and practices by which political subjects are constituted and deployed, along with the 
forces that have shaped and continue to shape modernity (Foucault, 1982; Inda, 
2008). 
 For Foucault, the art of government is distinct from sovereignty  – the exercise 
of power by the state over a defined territory. Power, argues Foucault, is not ‘erected 
around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and 
prohibition’ (1980: 121). As such, biopolitics does not simply emanate from a unitary 
government; it involves a multiple network of actors, organizations, and entities 
within and outside state contexts. Biopolitical governance consists of at least two 
connected elements. First, the art of governing is possible only within particular 
epistemological regimes of intelligibility – the construction of knowledge about 
populations that render them thinkable so as to make them amenable to political 
programming. In essence, biopolitics is a problematizing sphere of activity (Inda, 
2008). Problems – ranging from urban unrest, and economic downturns and ethnic 
conflict – need to be defined and classified in particular ways so that concrete policies 
can be formulated as solutions and thus amenable to the apparatuses of security as its 
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essential technical instrument. Second, to expedite a solution, biopolitical governance 
aims to cultivate particular types of collective agency and subjectivity (Foucault, 
1982).  
 Foucault’s biopolitics provides a framework for understanding the process 
through which victims are constructed as a central facet of governance after conflict. 
As noted above, in order for biopolitical technologies to be applied to populations, the 
reasons and rationalities for carrying out such interventions must be elaborated. In 
short, the societal problem has to be firstly defined in a particular way so as to lead to 
particular types of policy solutions. One powerful mode in which intrastate conflict is 
framed – in both scholarly and policymaking thinking – is the ‘new wars’ paradigm, 
which sees contemporary violence as ‘population-centric’  – it is directly aimed at 
civilians via forms of ethnic cleansing and genocide, in which mass rape, mutilations, 
and torture are a deliberate logic. In consequence, ‘war-torn societies are 
“traumatized” and require therapeutic management if conflict is to be ameliorated’ 
(Moon, 2009: 72).  
 In deploying the ‘traumatic frame’ to understand civilian responses to conflict 
(Moon, 2009), postwar reconstruction necessitates initiatives to help the population 
work through traumatic experiences so that they can experience ‘catharsis’, healing’ 
and ‘closure’ to allow the divided society to ‘move on’ and rebuild fragile state 
institutions. In fact, trauma is constructed to be not only an outcome of contemporary 
conflict but also a possible factor in its perpetuation. The failure, therefore, to 
confront traumatic experiences can lock societies into a pernicious cycle of violence, 
as it is assumed that the ‘abused’ will later become the ‘abuser’ (Pupavac, 2004).  
 Policies to deal with collective trauma have become a central part of 
postconflict reconstruction. For example, the World Health Organization (2002) 
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recommends ‘methods of trauma-healing’ to facilitate the ‘social process of 
reconciliation and peace-building’. The term ‘therapeutic governance’ has been 
coined by Pupavac (2004) to describe how such psychosocial programming creates 
depoliticising and dehumanising effects. Thus, the claim to govern for postconflict 
states lies in their ability to lay national trauma to rest (Moon, 2009), a policy that 
ironically acts to detach victims from rights. 
 For Foucault, the end goal of biopolitics is to make modern subjects and 
subjectivities. Applying a Foucaldian perspective: if peacebuilding is achieved by 
dealing with trauma, it is necessary to make populations see themselves in some way 
as victims. This form of biopolitics operates by getting certain groups to attach 
themselves for the first time to the victim identity. By constructing public policies and 
institutional mechanisms to cater for victims, it is hope that the broader population 
will become more amenable to political order and control. Foucault (1977) saw the 
purpose of governance as attempts to replace ‘wild bodies’ with ‘docile bodies’. 
‘Docile bodies’, in the context of peace processes, refers to how populations, once 
violent and ‘wild’ become, through state intervention, compliant with the objectives 
of stability and security.   
 Notably, to ensure efficacious governance, biopolitical regimes focus on 
uncovering the ‘truth’ so that the population is rendered amenable to political 
programming. The agencies of biopolitics, as Rose (1999: 30) argues, are preoccupied 
with ‘analyzing what counts as truth, who has the power to define truth, the role of 
different authorities of truth, and the epistemological, institutional and technical 
conditions for the production and circulation of truths’. This aspect is particularly 
salient in peace processes in respect to dealing with victims. Indeed, an integral 
component of contemporary peace processes involves some form of ‘truth 
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construction’, such as truth and reconciliation mechanisms, truth recovery processes, 
truth-telling formats, tribunals, commissions and historical inquiry teams, which aim 
to find out the truth about unsolved murders, whether conducted by the state or by 
outlawed paramilitary groups. Once truth is established, so the logic follows, this will 
lead to victims’ healing and is a necessary element of reconciliation (Mendeloff, 
2004).  
 It is of course important to note that the construction of the victim identity is 
not necessarily conducive to reconciliation and peacebuilding. Here, we can make a 
categorical distinction between ‘victims’ and ‘victimhood’. While the former category 
is a recognition of a status of loss for individuals, the latter indicates a group identity 
in which traumatic memory is politicized to justify action, including violence, against 
those accused of being responsible for victimizing the group (Jacoby, 2015).  
 
Agamben: Bare life, the state of exception, and victims 
Agamben’s (1998: 4) rendering of the biopolitical intends ‘to correct’ or at least ‘to 
complete’ Foucault’s analysis. In distinction to Foucault’s biopolitics which views 
power as an assemblage of institutions, procedures, knowledges, with little overall 
unity, Agamben places sovereignty at the nucleus of biopolitics. While Foucault’s 
biopolitics is concerned with the management of life, Agamben emphasizes the 
sovereign’s biopolitical power to classify and make distinctions with regards to forms 
of life and through a juridico-institutional power over death. Sovereign power does 
this by reducing subjects to a form of ‘bare life’ − a simple biological life stripped of 
both political and legal representation.  Agamben captures this status of ‘bare’ life 
through the image of homo sacer. In Roman law, homo sacer represented a figure 
banned and stripped of rights and who can be killed by anyone without fear of justice. 
10 
 
For Agamben (1998), modern nation-state sovereignty operates by designating groups 
as homo sacer – reduced to bare life and thus subject to ‘legitimate’ state violence in a 
‘state of exception’, in which the rule of law is suspended on the basis of protecting 
state security. Originally intended as an emergency procedure, the state of exception 
has ‘tend[ed] increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in 
contemporary politics’ (Agamben 2005: 2). Life is therefore embedded in the political 
sphere in the form of an ‘exclusion/inclusion’ relationship. Life can only be included 
in the polity insofar as it can legitimately negated and, in consequence, by affirming 
sovereign power. In the state of the exception, it is the sovereign who is both ‘outside 
and inside the juridical order’ (Agamben, 1998: 15). 
 Agamben (1999) argues that the camp represents the biopolitical nomos of the 
west. While the Nazi death camps figure as the purest example of the biopolitical, 
scholars have applied Agamben’s biopolitics to a range of modern camps, including 
Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and refugee camps in Palestine (Agamben, 1995; Jamal & 
Sandor, 2010; Owens, 2009; Ramadan & Fregonese, 2010). Yet, the status of victims 
in contemporary intrastate conflict and peace processes also provides an illustration of 
Agamben’s biopolitics. During violent conflict, the state or rebel groups who 
proclaim sovereign power diminish particular members of the civilian population to 
the status of bare life and then apply violence – often murderous – to them under the 
state of exception. In the period of transition from political violence to peace, the 
rights of victims are often suspended and denied under the pretence that victims’ 
justice forms a threat to security and stability. The status of bare life for victims is not 
only that their rights are placed in abeyance; their very existence is nullified as part of 




Northern Ireland: The Construction of the Victims’ Sector 
The violent conflict in Northern Ireland, which began in 1969, led to circa 3,700 
deaths and 50,000 serious injuries (Morrissey and Smyth, 2002). The conflict is 
typically identified as ethnonational: between Irish nationalists who demand the 
unification of the six counties of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland and 
Ulster unionists who resist such a move by desiring to maintain Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional status in the UK (Nagle and Clancy, 2010). The conflict included a 
number of atrocities carried out by the rival paramilitary groups and the British state. 
Violence was targeted at state forces, civilians in sectarian attacks and members of 
paramilitary organizations.  
 According to Dawson (2003: 130), the conflict was characterized by a lack of 
provision of support services for victims and ‘widespread psychic trauma was neither 
publically acknowledged nor discussed’. A UK government minister, Des Browne 
(2003) subsequently admitted, ‘in all that time [thirty years of conflict] there were no 
policies in relation to victims’. Despite this ‘culture of silence’, a small number of 
publically unfunded victims groups emerged in the 1980s. Most of these groups 
campaigned to illuminate the role of the British state in colluding with illegal 
paramilitaries to murder members of the nationalist population (Morrissey and Smyth, 
2002), such as Justice for the Forgotten, The issue of victims, however, effectively 
emerged as part of the developing peace process. In 1997, the policy silence was 
broken when a public report set out to ‘examine the feasibility of providing greater 
recognition for those who have become victims in the last thirty years as a 
consequence of events’ (Bloomfield, 1998: 8).  
 The significance of victims to the peace process was institutionalized in the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA), a peace accord mainly designed to forge 
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consociational power-sharing institutions to accommodate nationalists and unionists. 
A section of the GFA is dedicated to ‘Reconciliation and Victims of Violence’: ‘it is 
essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a 
necessary element of reconciliation’ (Northern Ireland Office, 1998: np). In 
consequence, a number of state-led initiatives were developed to construct the 
victims’ sector post-GFA, including the establishment of a Victims’ Liaison Unit to 
coordinate policies for victims; the formation of a Memorial Fund to pilot schemes for 
victims’ groups; and the creation of regional Trauma Advisory Boards, which aim to 
coordinate the provision of health services to victims’ groups. The state has also set 
up a number of inquiries and investigations into a number of controversial killings, 
many of which are unresolved. In 2006, for example, the UK government allocated 
£30million for the establishment of a Historical Enquiries Team (HET) to investigate 
some 2,000 unsolved murder cases.  Funding is another area through that the state 
supports the formation of victims’ groups. From April 1997 to March 2007, the 
British state furnished, by its own calculations, £43,962,152 (Nagle, 2016) on 
organizations they identify to be involved in providing support for victims’ group, 
supplemented by £7.6 million from the EU. At present (2019), it is estimated that 
there are approximately 80 victims’ groups across Northern Ireland.  Notably, 
however, many of these initiatives had a short shelf life.  In 2005, The Commission 
for Victims and Survivors Northern Ireland replaced the Victims Liaison Unit, as the 
statutory body with responsibility for issues related to victims and survivors; the 
Legacy Investigations Branch superseded the Historical Enquiries Team; and the 
Memorial Fund no longer exists. 
 While the initiation of a state funded victims’ sector appeared to correspond to 
an inclusive process of conflict resolution, it also reflected the British government’s 
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attempt to attain hegemonic leadership of the process from above. As Dawson (2003: 
129-130) argues, by seeking to construct a single integrated victims’ lobby, the state 
sought to position itself as a neutral arbiter (rather than as a participant in the conflict) 
by encouraging reconciliation between the two ‘warring factions’. 
 Returning to Foucault, the peace process generated the biopolitical 
construction of the victims’ sector. For Foucault, governance requires particular 
epistemological regimes of knowledge about populations to make them pliable to 
political programming. Social issues need to be problematized and identified through 
specific discursive languages so that particular policy solutions can be crafted in 
response. In order for the Northern Ireland peace process to take root, it firstly 
required an understanding that the conflict engendered traumatizing consequences 
that if not dealt with would stymie the progress of compromise and reconciliation. 
Thus, to engender a lasting, peaceful solution, the construction of the victims’ sector 
and victims’ agency became essential to this aim. 
 
Contestation: The Ulster Victims’ Movement 
There is, however, a tendency to see Foucault’s biopolitics as a form of mechanical 
determinism. Since subjects are supposedly created by power-relations they do not 
consciously control, the creation of subjectivity is a homogeneous process in which 
subjects are little more than ‘individual copies that are mechanically punched out’ 
(Habermas, 1987: 293). Yet Foucault recognized that biopolitcal programming cannot 
be expected to generate predictable outcomes and there instead multiple points of 
weakness that permit resistance and the emergence of subversive subjectivity. 
Rather than expedite forms of social agency and subjectification that bolster 
governance, such rational ‘administrative planning’, as Habermas puts it, ‘produces 
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unintended, unsettling and publicizing effects’ (1988: 72). Biopolitical governance 
can, in certain circumstances, lead to new forms of collective identity and 
mobilization that generate unintentional and even destabilizing results. In the context 
of Northern Ireland, while the construction of the victims’ sector was intended to 
foment peacebuilding, victims became a major site of ethnonational contestation that 
had the power to subvert the peace process. 
 A particularly powerful expression of this unpredictable agency is illuminated 
by the emergence of unionist victims’ social movements in the aftermath of the GFA. 
Between 1998 and 2000, in the region of thirty unionist victims’ groups emerged as 
newly formed organizations. While many of these groups helped distribute services to 
victims who identified themselves as unionist, a broader, umbrella movement 
surfaced which campaigned on the basis that the GFA represented a deal that 
victimized the unionist community. This broad-based mobilization, which I call the 
‘Unionist Victims’ Movement’, utilized protest activity to challenge the terms of the 
peace process. Thus, rather than deny the identity of victims, unionist movements 
harnessed its emotive power to pursue divisive ethnopolitics. 
 The Unionist Victims’ Movement’ emerged in a context of unionist 
disenfranchisement with the GFA. Although a small majority of unionists supported 
the 1998 Agreement, unionist confidence in it quickly eroded. Informed by a liberal 
pluralist, multicultural framework, the Belfast Agreement – among many aspects –
redressed a number of imbalances and grievances identified by Irish nationalists 
(Hayes et al, 2005). Labelled the ‘equality agenda’ by nationalists, a rather contrary 
descriptor was used by unionist politicians. For them, the Agreement ushered in a 
series of policies that were clearly inequitable, such as the reform of the police 
service, a historically almost wholly unionist institution, which adopted recruitment 
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quotas to amend the imbalance of nationalists in the force (Nagle 2017). Unionist 
politicians framed these quotas as acts of blatant discrimination against unionists 
(Hayes et al, 2005). Unionists pointed to further concessions given to militant Irish 
nationalist groups to embrace the path to peaceful politics, such as the release of 
prisoners convicted of paramilitary offences, amnesties for so-called ‘on-the-run’ 
paramilitaries and the downscaling of the British military presence across Northern 
Ireland.  
 Notably, unionist grievances with the GFA were articulated through the 
language of victimhood. In proclaiming victimhood, unionism embraced a new form 
of self-identity and a mode of subjectification that can be seen as a consequence of the 
biopolitical peace process. While unionism historically presented an image of a 
confident democratic majority secure in their political identity, the advent of the 1998 
Agreement – especially its emphasis on supporting victims – increasingly saw 
unionists display ‘a predilection for victimhood’ (Finlay, 2001: 3).  
 A leading example of this politicized victims’ identity was the ‘Northern Irish 
Victims of Terrorism Association’ (NIVTA), which was formed by 80-strong 
committee of victims’ groups, Protestant clergy, political parties and cultural 
organizations. The movement embarked upon a 117-mile trek across Northern 
Ireland, which they called the ‘Long March’. The march, the committee announced, 
was intended as a demonstration of ‘human rights’ for what they labelled as a 
victimized unionist community in Northern Ireland. On subsequent occasions the 
organizers and participants spoke about the march upholding ‘Protestant civil rights’ 
(Irish Times, 19 June 1999). An organizer of the ‘Long March’ stated: ‘we want to 
show who are the real victims in Northern Ireland’. Echoing this theme, another 
leader stated: ‘We aim to highlight the fact that Protestants have legitimate grievances 
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which have been ignored’ (Belfast Telegraph, 26 May 1999). NIVTA stated its aims 
as: ‘the right to live free from murder, fear and intimidation, recognition and support 
for the victims of terrorism, respect for democracy, parity of esteem for unionists and 
economic justice for deprived unionist communities’ (Belfast Newsletter, 17 June 
1999). 
 Alongside NIVTA, a number of state-funded unionist victims groups emerged 
at the same time and which took a strong position of opposition against the terms of 
the GFA, which they claimed had victimized them. Explaining their origins, another 
prominent victims’ group, West Tyrone Voice, stated:  
 
like other pro-British innocent victims’ groups, [it] has its genesis in the latter months of 
1998, in the wake of the early and accelerated release of terrorist prisoners in accord with the 
provisions of the Belfast Agreement 1998. Victims realised that there was nothing in this 
agreement for them, felt keenly the injustice of such early release of terrorists back on to the 
streets, and came together to ‘voice’ their concerns (West Tyrone Voice, 2008: 1). 
 
 The emergence of the unionist victims’ identity and social movement exposed 
a contradiction in the biopolitical peace process. While the biopolitics of peace 
process appeared to recognize and accommodate victims, former paramilitary 
members were, at the same time, granted amnesty. This situation generated 
paradoxical dynamics – peace is generated by both amnesty and the encouragement of 
victimhood, two forces that are typically irreconcilable in postwar societies. 
 
Lebanon: Amnesia as State Religion 
Lebanon’s civil war was extremely complex and can more readily be defined as a 
succession of conflicts with different phases, including interventions by Syria, Israel, 
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and the Palestinian Liberation Army. Although the conflict was not at root sectarian, 
it nonetheless expedited an intense ‘sectarianization’ of society. Sectarianization 
describes how the key belligerents manipulated and constructed ethnoreligious 
identities, typically through acts of extreme violence, to cleave society along 
communal lines in pursuit of strategic self-interest. The civil war left 144,000 dead, of 
which 90 per cent were civilians (Jaquemet, 2009: 69-70; ICTJ, 2014). Thousands of 
civilians were kidnapped or abducted, often simply for purely sectarian reasons, and 
their bodies have never been recovered. A police report from 1991 stated that there 
were 17,415 persons missing, a figure subsequently revised downwards (Maalouf, 
2009: 1; ICTJ, 2014: 15).   
 The conflict officially ended with the 1989 Taef Agreement, which failed to 
mention victims or any mechanism for dealing with the legacy of the war. ‘The 
Lebanese state and society’, Jaquemet (2009: 69) argues, ‘have favored amnesia over 
truth seeking’. This culture of social forgetting about the civil war was shaped by the 
Taef Agreement and the resumption of power sharing. The motto of Taef – ‘no victor, 
no vanquished’ – meant that none of the groups should be held accountable for the 
violence and duly punished.  
 The post-war political elites had a vested interested in promoting forgetting. 
Many of them were leading sectarian warlords responsible for the atrocities carried 
out during the civil war and they subsequently used their peacetime political offices to 
silence investigations and formal inquiries into the war (ICTJ, 2014).1 Recognizing 
that they would be first to be prosecuted, in 1991 the parliament passed a general 
amnesty Law 84, which on a selective basis pardoned political crimes committed 
during the civil war (Picard, 2002: 165) and made no mention of victims. In addition, 
circa 8,000 militia fighters were integrated into the security forces and the public 
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administration. The Lebanese president justified the amnesty law as a necessary 
condition for peace. As one activist for victims explained to me, the law ‘erected 
amnesia to a state religion’: 
 
When you know very well that all of the big projects undertaken in this country were just 
strengthening the rule of those former warlords who whitewashed their traditional records. 
You cannot tell me that with these people who promoted the religion of amnesia you can 
really build peace (interview, June 2015). 
 
 The logic of ‘clean slate’ ideologies (Khalaf, 2012: 78) about the civil war and 
victims was further sanctioned by what was euphemistically titled the ‘Pax-Syriana’. 
Syria occupied Lebanon during the civil war and despite its promise to withdraw after 
a short transitional period from the signing of Ta’if, the regime extended its self-
appointed role as protector of Lebanon. As an authoritarian regime, the Syrian state 
had little interested in promoting transparency and accountability and instead pursued 
a policy of installing former warlords into government positions as a means of 
maintaining control over Lebanon. Thus, under Syrian tutelage, the state enforced a 
culture of silence about victims and the memory of the civil war, including a media 
censorship law (1994), and by denying victims justice through criminal tribunals or 
restitution via compensation schemes and truth and reconciliation formats (Haugbolle, 
2010). This situation is reinforced today as the state closes down any attempt to locate 
and retrieve the bodies of the disappeared. In distinction to Northern Ireland where a 
victims’ sector and identity was constructed as part of the peace process, the status of 
victims in the post-civil war era have been completely elided.  
 How does Agamben’s reading of the biopolitical help illuminate this process 
of state-sponsored amnesia and denial of victims’ rights? For Agamben, biopolitics is 
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inextricably connected to the capacity of the sovereign to suspend the law in the state 
of exception. Those identified by the sovereign as a mortal threat to national security 
are classified as homo sacer – figures that possess only bare life and deprived of 
political and legal rights – and consequently can be removed through legitimate state 
violence. Such killing without punishment leads to deaths that are ‘not honoured, 
mourned or memorialised’ (Owens, 2009: 572). In postwar Lebanon, the state of 
exception has been applied to the issue victims, which is placed as a danger to peace 
and security. The former warlords, now reinvented as political luminaries, deployed 
the state of exception via Law 84 to apply political amnesia and to ensure that victims 
do not receive rights and the families of the disappeared are left without justice. 
 Agamben’s parsing of biopolitics, however, rests on a strong relationship 
between a unitary form of sovereignty and the state of exception. The power of the 
sovereign is enacted through its capability to cast out any person from the political 
order. Yet, this vision of a homogenous sovereign is problematic in relation to 
Lebanon. As noted by Ramadan and Fragonese (2017), Lebanon has not achieved 
sovereignty defined as the nation-state with exclusive authority and a monopoly of 
legitimate violence within its borders. The Lebanese state instead resembles a plural 
form of governance within a framework of hybrid sovereignty. This arrangement sees 
the Lebanese state enact rule through calculated collaboration with, and tolerance of, 
nonstate and quasi-state actors. For example, Hezbollah, the militia/political party, 
operates as a de facto state within Lebanon with its own independent army. This 
complex mode of sovereignty is further intensified by the role of powerful external 
actors – particularly Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia – thus ensuring Lebanon is ‘marked 
by a perpetual blurring of imagined boundaries between the state and its outside’ 
(Hourani, 2013: 40). The hybrid character of Lebanese sovereignty is additionally 
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reinforced by the ‘allotment state’ (‘muhasasa’): the power-sharing system which not 
only guarantees government positions for the powerful ethnoreligious leaders, but a 
high degree of communal autonomy over their own affairs (Nagle, 2018). 
 Thus, rather than a single sovereign, the application of the state of exception in 
Lebanon is ‘a hybrid act, taken by and between state and other actors’ (Ramadan and 
Fragonese, 2017: 953). This hybrid sovereignty, I argue, acts to intensify the 
biopolitical status of victims in Lebanon. The uneasy balance of power that binds a 
multiplicity of internal and external actors rests on enforcing a culture of denial 
regarding victims and the disappeared. The actors that constitute Lebanon’s plural 
governance networks were responsible for the violence of the civil war and conspire 
to deny victims’ rights on the basis that any admission of responsibility by one group 
for atrocities would unravel the so-called civil peace. The issue of victims is thus 
rendered into a security issue and reinforces the system of hybrid sovereignty; it 
constitutes part of the governing logic of this apparatus that is regulated through a 
balance of power between factions. 
 
Destituent Resistance and Victims? 
Agamben’s description of biopolitics has been critiqued for a ‘lack of attention and 
space for resistance and agency’ (Jamal and Sandor, 2010: 1).  For those individuals 
categorized by the sovereign as homo sacer there is no possibility for the re-
articulation of politics (Owens 2009). In response, a number of scholars have sought 
to explore the way that groups resist their classification as ‘bare life’. Owens, for 
example, explores how refugees engaging in lip sewing as a form of protest against  
their status demonstrates that the ‘complete embrace of bare life’ is the only way to 
‘unmask’ the violence of sovereignty and re-establish more open relations of power 
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(Owens, 2010: 573). Agamben (2014) has also attempted to address this absence 
through the framework of what he calls ‘destituent power’. 
 Destituent power differs from revolutionary forms of resistance which 
violently oppose and replace the sovereign with a new constitutive order. Violent 
resistance by those accorded bare life is ultimately reincorporated back into the 
sovereign’s logic of power, especially by the sovereign framing such acts as security 
threats that require an intensification of the state of exception. Rather than oppose or 
instil a new constitutive order, destituent power is the form of activities that make 
governmental apparatuses inoperative by evading, nullifying rendering powerless the 
practices and techniques mobilized by sovereign authority. As Joronen (2017: 94) 
explains, ‘destituent resistance’ is ‘turning techniques of government so that they are 
unable to efficiently execute what they were originally aimed to do’. I turn to explore 
the possible forms of resistance, including distituent power, used by Lebanese 
victims’ movements in the context of the state’s hybrid sovereignty.  
 To a large extent, resistance has been articulated in Lebanon by victims’ 
movements. These non-sectarian movements – often featuring the families of the 
disappeared – mobilize to demand accountability and justice from the state. This 
mode of contestation fundamentally relies upon unmasking power. If the postwar 
system of political sectarianism expedites disappearance, victims’ movements 
represent what Arendt (1958) termed a ‘space of appearance’. As a victims’ 
campaigner explained to me, victims and the disappeared are ‘the dirt swept under the 
carpet’ by the political elites. The objective of the movements, therefore, is to become 
public. 
 The act of disappearance is a primary tactic of terroristic groups and states that 
seek to maximize fear among the population. Illegal abductions generate what 
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Taussig (1999) calls a ‘public secret’: something widely known across the society but 
fear forbids people to speak openly about it. The emergence of Lebanon’s first 
victims’ movement signified an effort to make visible the situation of the disappeared. 
‘The Committee of the Families of the Kidnapped and Disappeared’ (CFKD) – which 
began in November 1982 – sustained a fierce public campaign with protest tactics. 
During the civil war, the movement held regular sit-in protests outside government 
buildings, held symbolic intercommunal meetings at the interface between Christian 
and Muslim districts, and shut down one of the capital’s main roads where abductions 
often occurred. During the peace process, the movement holds an annual 
demonstration/commemoration of the day the war started to highlight the unresolved 
issue of the disappeared (Jaquemet, 2009; Maalouf, 2009). 
 Another victims’ movement, which mobilizes for the families of people 
abducted by the Syrian security forces during and after the civil war, also uses 
visibility and protest politics. The Support of Lebanese in Detention and Exile 
(SOLIDE) describes itself as ‘a non-sectarian and independent NGO based in Beirut’ 
(SOLIDE, 2012), began its protest campaign in December 1989 when activists 
formed a 24-kilometer human chain in the city centre. SOLIDE’s most notable protest 
began in in 2005 when they set up a permanent tent in Beirut city centre, directly in 
front of the UN building and within clear sight of the presidential place and 
parliament, to demand the government establishes a national mechanism for victims. 
Furnished and decorated with pictures of the disappeared, the tent provides a focal 
point for the families and activists to gather and as a starting point for protests against 
the parliament and other government buildings. A SOLIDE spokesperson explained: 
‘The tent is a reminder that there was a war and one of the things that remains after 
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the war is the issue of the victims. It’s a reminder in front of the parliament here, the 
government behind us’ (interview, June 2015).  
 Both CFKD and SOLIDE utilize traditional social movement protest tactics to 
try and challenge the state’s denial of victims’ rights. SOLIDE, in particular, use 
protest to force the state to react with violence against the families of the disappeared, 
an act which illuminates to the wider society and the international community the 
moral deficiencies of the political elites. An evocative part of SOLIDE’s protests is 
the mothers of the disappeared, elderly women who are at the front line of 
demonstrations. These women are willingly corralled into confronting the security 
forces guarding government and state buildings. A leader explained: 
 
The ladies lay on the road with chains. They link each other with chains to remind people of 
the chains of the disappeared. We had a demonstration outside the parliament where we 
brought pictures and banners. We clashed with the security there and we had a meeting and 
then we stormed the Presidential Palace with the families and the civilians that came with us, 
and we stormed the palace and I got to parliament.  It was number one news on the news 
(interview, June 2015).  
  
Yet, to return to Agamben, the protest tactics used by SOLIDE represent a form of 
constitutive power, an attempt to contest or overthrow the power of the state. Such 
resistance only reaffirms the power of the security state to apply the state of 
exception. Rather than forging important policy changes, SOLIDE’s protest activities 
have generated coercive strategies from the state. In April 2004, the police attacked 
SOLIDE protestors after they gathered in the city centre to submit a petition to the 
UN. In 2006 when SOLIDE organized a press conference to launch a report into the 
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Ministry of Defence’s use of torture in post-war Lebanon, the security forces arrested 
and interrogated members of the movement.  
 The potential of victims’ movement to challenge and resist state power is 
further compounded by the state’s hybrid sovereignty. There is no centralized and 
unitary state that victims’ movements can operate within and oppose. With little 
possibility of directly forcing the sectarian leaders to expedite policy change, victims’ 
movements ‘upscale’ their efforts by targeting the international community. 
Movements urge international agencies to force the Lebanese state to become more 
accountable to victims, a strategy that appears rational given the stress on the 
importance of recognizing victims’ rights as a core modus operandi of the 
international order. As a movement leader stated: 
 
For me the most important feature of the missing is the fact that it’s an ongoing crime. It is a 
kind of living reminder of the war that by international law you cannot say that if someone 
disappears ‘khalas’, ‘we forget’. What is the use of going to the parliament when you don’t 
trust the members of parliament to do anything? Here in front of the UN, at least you can 
voice your demands. Kofi Annan, the UN representative came here as well as many UNCHR  
[United Nations Commission for Human Rights] officers and spoke to us (interview, June 
2015). 
 The attempts by the families of the disappeared to make the international 
community put pressure on the sectarian elites to address victims made little headway. 
In their foremost desire to see Lebanon maintain what they view as a modicum of 
stability, the UN are unwilling to push for any form of dealing with the past lest it 





We had several meetings with the UN, and we tried to establish a truth and reconciliation and 
justice mechanism in Lebanon like in South Africa. The advice the UN gave us was that 
Lebanon is a country of compromise, so the people who are responsible for what happened 
during the war are running the country today. So forget about justice (interview, June 2015). 
  
 The refusal of the UN to support the victims’ movement echoes Agamben’s 
reflection on the international community’s complicity in enforcing the state of 
exception. While victims of state violence signify a ‘disquieting element’ (Agamben, 
1994) to the international order, these hominus sacri are included in that order 
through a separate international regime of humanitarianism: ‘a space of exception set 
apart from the common world but still under control’ (Agier, 2011, 147). While 
international human rights organisations and the UN seek to make victims’ rights a 
central part of their humanitarian policies, these actors can only grasp human life in 
the figure of bare or sacred life, and ‘despite themselves, maintain a secret solidarity 
with the very powers they ought to fight’ (Agamben, 1998: 133–34). 
 Despite the politics of visibility and unmasking affirming constitutive power, 
can Lebanon’s victims’ movements deploy ‘destituent resistance’: the capacity to 
deactivate the effects of power so that it is unable to operate ‘bare life’? One way in 
which movements evoke destituent power is through resisting any attempt by the state 
to classify the disappeared as officially dead. For Agamben, those defined as homo 
sacer and assigned bare life are the ‘living dead’, they are alive but classed as already 
dead. In Lebanon, many of the leading activists for victims refuse to accept that their 
relatives are dead, a position that obstructs the state’s efforts to elide their complicity 
in sectarian murder. 
 On May 25, 1995, Law 434 was introduced by the Lebanese government, 
which provided ‘principles for declaring the missing dead’ (Maalouf, 2009; ICTJ, 
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2014: 15). Under the auspices of Law 434, any person missing for at least four years 
is legally classified as deceased, and the families are permitted to undertake legal 
procedures to record their deaths and even claim limited financial compensation. By 
categorizing ‘the disappeared’ as legally ‘dead’, the political elites hoped to 
completely close down any form of state-led investigation into finding the truth about 
those responsible for the crimes let alone attempting to retrieve the bodies (ICTJ, 
2014: 16). The families refused to acquiesce with Law 434. Through retaining the 
status of ‘disappeared’ rather than accepting ‘dead’ for the missing, they maintain that 
the Lebanese political class and indeed wider society urgently needs to confront the 
legacy of the civil war and that maintaining a form of social silence keeps the wounds 
of history open. The notion of the ‘living dead’, therefore, is apprehended by victims’ 
movements to articulate a form of destituent power, which deactivates and renders the 
logic of governance inoperative (Agamben, 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have used Foucault and Agamben’s divergent interpretation of 
biopolitics to examine the different strategies for dealing with victims in two 
postconflict societies. Foucault’s original statement, which sees biopolitics as the 
‘numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the 
control of populations’ (1980: 136), is used to analyse the way in which the state and 
other agencies have constructed a victims’ sector in Northern Ireland as a means of 
furthering hegemonic leadership over the peace process. Agamben’s biopolitics, 
which rests on the sovereign’s power over life, is harnessed in the paper to illuminate 
how the hybrid Lebanese state have pursued a policy of negating victims’ rights. 
While biopolitics, in both versions, have often been critiqued for providing little 
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scope for unpredictable agency and resistance, I have explored these forms via the 
mobilization of victims’ social movements. In Northern Ireland, the emergence of 
Unionist Victims’ Movement harnessed the emotive power of victimhood to disrupt 
and even oppose the terms of the peace process. In Lebanon, victims’ movements use 
destituent power to resist attempts by the state and the wider international community 
to impose silence and amnesia on victims’ rights and the disappeared.  
 Dealing with the legacy of intrastate conflict is seen as one of the fundamental 
criteria necessary to support accountability, rule of law, and sustainable peace and 
reconciliation. Addressing the rights and needs of victims is at the heart of this 
approach and the legal obligations of a responsible state is to protect and uphold 
victims of violence and if a government fails to attend to victims and their injuries it 
is failing in one of its most basic political duties (Biggar, 2003). Despite such 
responsibilities, many states draw a line under the past, thus, in the process, omitting 
victims’ needs. This paper, therefore, seeks to contribute to a broader understanding 
of these dynamics by utilising theories of the biopolitcal. These conceptual languages, 
I argue, provide a structure to help understand how victims are either constructed or 
negated in peace process and also the role of victims’ movements in these processes. 
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